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VOLUME XVIL NOVEMBER, 1942 NUMBER 4
THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
AND ITS LEGAL EFFECTS
NONA B. FUmERTON
Within the past decade by statutory enactment and with the support
of public opinion, labor has achieved the long-sought-after right to
bargain collectively. It is for this right, together with the recognition of
unions as' proper bargaining agents, that labor has carried on its indus-
trial warfare in recent years, and yet the right to bargain collectively is
itself of importance only in so far as it results in an agreement creating
legal rights and obligations between employers and their employees.
The significance of the collective labor agreement is naturally of
importance to employers and their workers, but the public as a whole has'
an equally vital interest in the matter. The strike and its picket line,
the lockout and the blacklist all create economic waste ultimately borne
by the public. The concurrent disruption of industrial life and the-
imminence of violence and bloodshed suggest the value of industrial
peace to the community, ind this is particularly true in wartime, when
the utmost possible elimination of interruptions in production becomes
a matter of urgent iational concern. The collective agreement, repre-
senting the culmination of bargaining between two substantially equal
economic groups, offers perhaps the best method of establishing stabil-
ity in the employer-employee relationship. In the analysis, then, of
the problems created in the attempted enforcement of these agreements,
the effect that their interpretation will have upon all three groups-
laborers, employers, and the public-must be considered. It is with
this in mind that we undertake to outline the problems relating to the
legal validity of the collective labor agreement. It must be recognized,
of course, that many developments in the law relative to the nature
and effect of collective bargaining agreements will be more or less frozen
for the duration of the war, with final decisions on many important
questions held temporarily in abeyance until the emergency is over.
The history of the development of these collective agreements from
the status of merely moral undertakings to that of legally enforceable
contracts presents the licture of the courts struggling to find some
appropriate juristic concept to serve as a basis for dealing with this new
type of economic behavior. Confronted with a form of group conduct
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which, although possessing many of the attributes of familiar relation-
ships, entailed other more complicated factors, the courts have striven
to apply familiar common law principles. The floundering of the
courts in their search for a solution is exemplified by the descriptive
terms used in relation to these agreements, such as the declaration that:
"An agreement upon wages and working conditions between
the managers of an industry and its employees, whether made
in an atmosphere of peace or under the stress of strike or
lockout resembles in many ways a treaty."'
Illustrative of this same confusion are judicial statements that such
agreements are continuing offers to be accepted by the individual
employees,2 or that they create usages and laws of the industry,' or
more modernly, that they are contracts. 4
A collective bargaining agreement is characterized principally by the
essential fact that one of the parties is a collective group representing a
body of employees, that is, the union. The other party to the under-
standing, representing the employer, may be either an individual em-
ployer or a collective group, an employers' association. The agreement
is primarily concerned with working conditions and may cover a wide-
variety of subjects ranging from the more normal provisions as to
hours and wages to elaborate stipulations for methods of arbitration,
shop grievance committees, apprentices, closed shops, and restrictions
on the right to deal with non-union employers. These agreements also
often include clauses covering the termination, modification, and renewal
of the contract; provisions for sanitation and for the safety of the
workers; covenants against strikes and lockouts; stipulations as to
discharge, transfer, and lay-off; and the extremely important and
essential recognition of the union as the bargaining representative of
the employees.5
Although the various provisions of these agreements offer certain
difficulties in interpretation because of their technical nature, nonethe-
less, the main problem is to determine the exact legal effect of the
agreement in its entirety. It is with this problem that this paper is
mainly concerned.
A collective labor agreement bears directly upon the rights and
interests of at least three classes, and in some circumstances four. There
is, first, the individual employee: Does he obtain any rights under
the agreement? Does it operate to restrict his conduct or impose
liability upon him? There is also the union: Is it bound by this
Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Webb, 64 F. (2d) 902 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933).
Rentschler v. Missouri Pacific R.R. 126 Neb. 493, 253 N. W. 694 (1934).
'Hudson v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway, 152 Ky.
711, 154 S. W. 47 (1913).
'Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931).
'See 1 C. C. H. LABOR SERvIcE (3d ed.) 5 611 et. seq. for illustrations
of some collective agreements.
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understanding? Has it obtained rights enforceable against the em
ployer? Can an unincorporated association either secure enforceable
rights or subject itself to duties under the agreement? Finally,
there is the employer with similar problems and questions to be
answered, and in certain circumstances there is the additional factor of
an employers' association.
The courts, in their first attempts to ascertain the exact nature of
these agreements, were primarily impressed by the inability of a
voluntary unincorporated association to enter into a binding contract.
Since the union could not be viewed as a legal entity, it seemed to
follow logically that the stipulations signed by it could have no legal
effect as between the parties. Furthermore, as a general rule there was
no specific undertaking by individual employees to work for definite
periods of time, and as a result it was held that there was no one actually
obligated by the agreement and,, in fact, no consideration for the
employer's promises. Therefore, the courts in the early cases often
referred to such undertakings as being morally binding upon the
employer and the union, or as mere gentlemen's agreements without any
legal validity. Under such an approach the agreements were, of course,
entirely ineffectual, and the parties to the contracts, as well as the public,
were deprived of their benefits.
As time went on, however, and resort to the courts to enforce these
agreements became more frequent, new approaches were devised by
which some validity could be given to them. The usage theory was first
suggested, then the agency doctrine, and today, with ever increasing
acceptance, the contract approach.
The Usage Concept:
The usage theory is predicated on the doctrine that no contract has
been formed between the union and the employer but that it merely
creates a law of the industry.6 The leading case expressing this
rationale is Hudson v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway7
in which the court, unable to find consideration for the employer's
undertaking, held that the collective agreement merely established trade
usages. A usage, as defined by the court,
"* * * refers to 'an established method of dealing, adopted
in a particular place, or by those engaged in a particular voca-
tion or trade, which acquires legal force, because people make
contracts in reference to it.' ",
8 Yazoo & M. V. IL Co. v. Webb, supra note 1. Although it is possible to
hold that there is a contract between the union and the employer, and
that it in addition creates a usage which will limit the power of the
individual employees to contract, such an approach does not seem to have
been used by the courts.
7 Supra note 3.8 The definition was taken from a statement in Byrd v. Beall, 150 Ala.
122, 43 So. 749 (1907).
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Under the theory announced in this case, the only contracts which
create any legal rights are the individual contracts of employment
entered into separately by each worker. The result of this doctrine is
the repudiation of any collective right and the recognition only of a
group of separate contracts, whose terms are limited by the usages set
up in the collective agreement.
The theory itself, however, presents numerous logical difficulties.
The courts have been unable to agree on the question of the necessity
for express adoption of the agreement by the employee. If the agree-
ment creates a usage as commonly understood in the law of contracts,
mere knowledge of its existence, without express adoption, will be
enough to permit a court to read such custom into the individual
employment contracts, unless there is some showing of an inconsistent
purpose. Some courts, adhering strictly to this normal contractual
approach, have held that the usages established in the collective agree-
ment will be read into all individual employment contracts entered into
with knowledge of the collective agreement and without express repudia-
tion thereof.' 0 Not all courts, however, have accepted this view, for some
have required an express adoption of the usage before it will be treated
as a term in the individual contract." Such an approach seems diffi-
cult to justify or to reconcile with the basic rules as to usages.
The modification of the agreement is another aspect of the problem
which suggests further conceptual flaws in this theory. To be effective
and useful, it is vital that the collective agreement be flexible, subject to
change and alteration, and yet the very essence of a usage is its stability
and long accepted use.1 2 Since the problem of modification introduces
other factors, it will be discussed in detail later, but it is mentioned
here to indicate the weaknesses of this approach by the courts.
The most fundamental criticism of the usage doctrine, however, is
directed at its failure to recognize any collective right or liability. The
union in its own capacity is unable to enforce the terms of the agreement
and must rely upon the initiative of each individual employee to enforce
its provisions. Likewise, the employer is given no assurance of stability
91 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS H§ 247 and 248 (1931).
10 Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault, 157 Tenn. 461, 9 S. W. (2d) 692 (1928).
"We think the legal effect of the agreement between the operators
and the miners is that it became a part of and formed the basis of the
contract of employment between each operator accepting it and each
of the employees, who entered or continued in his service and employ-
ment of such employer with knowledge of its execution, and in the
absence of any express contract between the individual employee and
his employer inconsistent with the terms of the agreement." p. 694.
11Burnetta v. Marceline Coal Co., 180 Mo. 241, 79 S. W. 136 (1904),
where the theory was applied to allow the employee to recover. Hamilton,
Individual Rights Arising from Collective Labor Contracts, 3 Mo. L. REv.
252 (1938).
12 Anderson, Collective Bargaining Agreements, 15 ORE. L. REV. 229
(1936); Hamilton, supra note 11.
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in his labor relations since he has no power or right to enforce the
contract against the union.
In discussing the rights created by collective agreements, further
mention will be made of the usage doctrine, and its validity will be
compared with the other accepted approaches.
The Agency Theory.
Still burdened with the view that the union was unable to contract
for itself, some courts adopted the agency theory as a method of giving
some effect to collective bargaining agreements. As under the usage
doctrine, there is no contract relationship between the union and the
employer but solely between the employer and his individual employees.
The union is merely the agent in forming the contract, the principals
being the individual employees.' s
This theory has not found very general acceptance, probably because
of the practical difficulty in establishing the agency relationship,
especially where an employee is not a member of the union or joins
after the understanding is effected. Furthermore, if the employee is a
member- of the union and specifically voted against the provision, it is
purely a fiction to hold that the union was an authorized agent acting
for the employee.' 4
This doctrine has been dismissed in the following summary manner.
"It has never been of any importance in the development of
these individual rights, for no case has ever protected such
rights in reliance upon it. Without support either in logic or
authority, it is not the law and should not be."'
The Third Party Beneficiary Theory:
Of recent years another analysis has been made of these collective
labor agreements differing radically from the two prior theories in that it
is based upon the assumption of a valid contract between the' employer
and the union and a recognition of the juristic personality of the latter.
The agreement is termed a third party beneficiary contract giving
rights to the individual employee as the beneficiary thereof.' 6 This
doctrine is more satisfactory than the other two discussed above, since
it does recognize the collective rights, but it is still not an adequate
solution in all circumstances. Its greatest deficiency lies in the failure to
find any theory by which the employer may enforce the contract
against an individual employee. Since the latter is not a party to the
contract, and since as yet there is no theory of a third party obligor,
'
3 One of the most cited cases illustrating this theory is Mueller v. Chi-
cago & N. W. Ry. Co., 194 Miiin. 83, 259 N. W. 798 (1935).
"Note (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1221; note (1931) 31 CoL. L. Rzv. 1156.
' Hamilton, supra note 11.1 Yazoo & M. V. Railway Co. v. Sideboard, supra note 4. Also see Gulla
v. Barton, 164 App. Div. 293, 149 N. Y. S. 952 (1914); (1941) Cincinnati,
New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry. Co. v. Hill. Washington has recognized
this doctrine in Huston v. Washington Wood & Coal Co., 4 Wn. (2d)' 449,
103 P. (2d) 1095 (1940).
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he is apparently under no liability.' 7  However, this objection would
seem to be of little real importance. The interest of the union in the
agreement would appear to be sufficient to cause it to exercise
disciplinary power over its members, thereby forcing them to conform to
the agreement. The non-union worker would present more of a
problem, but even this difficulty is minimized by the growth of closed
shop and preferential hiring agreements.
Briefly, then, the usage, agency, and third party beneficiary doctrines
have all been applied by the courts to give collective labor agreements
some validity. The exact effect of each of these three rationales will
be developed in detail in a discussion of the rights and duties of the
various parties. The important fact is that the courts are now, by one
device or another, enforcing these agreements.
THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEES
Right To Damages:
From the standpoint of the individual employee, the fact that an
agreement is accorded legal significance is only important as it affects
his own rights and liabilities. He is primarily interested in determining
whether or not he himself may enforce the contract against his employer
if the latter discharges him in violation of the agreement or pays him
less than the wage stipulated therein. Or in more practical terms, he
is interested in knowing whether or not he can obtain compensation for
the loss which he suffers because of his employer's breach of the contract.
While there have been a few decisions like that in Kessell v. Great
Northern Ry Co.,'8 which recognized the existence of a valid contract
between the employer and the union but denied the right of an employee
to sue individually, the majority of courts have recognized the right of
the employee to bring suit to enforce these contracts. Of course, if the
usage or agency doctrine is applied the problem is simplified, for the suit
is not upon the collective agreement but upon the separate contracts of
employment.' 9 Suits for damages are now generally successfully prose-
1" Anderson, supra note 12; Hamilton, supra note 11. But cf. Whiting
Milk Co. v. Grondin, 282 Mass. 41, 184 N. E. 379 (1933), in which the em-
ployer sued an employee for violating a provision of the agreement re-
quiring him, upon termination of his employment, to refrain from selling
milk to the employer's customers for a period of ninety days.
"IKessell v. G. N. Ry. Co., 51 F. (2d) 304 (W. D. Wash., 1931). This
case relied upon Young v. Canadian Northern Ry., A. C. 38, 144 L. T. 255
P. C. (1931), which denied the propriety of suit by an individual employee
and held that the method of enforcement was through a strike by the union.
However, it is possible that the Kessell case would recognize the validity
of a suit by the union to enforce the contract. In some jurisdictions where
the usage doctrine is still applied, it may be necessary for an employee to
show an express adoption of the terms of the collective agreement before
those provisions will be treated as incorporated into his individual em-
ployment contract.
19 Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Webb, supra note 1; Hudson v. Cincinnati,
New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway, supra note 3.
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cuted by individual workers, and this form of-relief has proved a fairly
adequate remedy in cases where an employer has refused to pay a
stipulated wage. Under any of the three theories it is possible to
allow recovery for the difference between the amount paid and the
agreed compensation.20 The main differences arise in the event the
employer contends that there has been a modification of the agreement.
21
Damages have also been recovered for wrongful discharge,2 2 although
some courts, applying the usage theory, have denied recovery. 28 Under
this latter doctrine, since the only contract is the individual contract of
employment which the employee can terminate at will, the courts have
refused to penalize the employer for exercising a similar power by dis-
charging the worker. This is merely one illustration of the failure on the
part of the courts to realize the actual effect of the collective bargain.
The more difficult problem in relation to the right to damages is the
measure to be used to determine the loss in any particular case. If the
suit is merely for the stipulated wage which the plaintiff was entitled
to under the contract, it is fairly simple to allow a suit for the difference
between the wages which he was paid and those provided for.2 4 More
complicated questions arise when the suit is for damages for wrongful
discharge or non-recognition of seniority rights, with the concomitant
failure to be recalled to work. Since there is seldom any pkovision
requiring employment for a definite period of time, it becomes almost
impossible actually to compute the amount lost by the employee. How-
ever, it is certain that whatever the loss, the courts will require the
employee to mitigate his damages by attempting to find re-employ-
ment.
2 5
Right to Equitable Relief:
Damages, even when allowed, have not proved to be adequate com-
pensation in all situations. As a result, employees have turned to equity,
2 See Gulla v. Barton, supra note 16, and McNeill v. Hacker, 21 N. Y. S.
(2d) 432 (1940) in which the third party beneficiary doctrine is applied
to allow recovery. Also see United States Daily Publishing Corp. v. Nichols,
32 F. (2d) 834, (C. C. A., D. C., 1929), an example of a true usage or custom.21 The problem of modification is discussed at page 189 et seq.
22 See Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault, supra note 10 (usage); Mueller
v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., supra note 13, where, although recovery was
denied on the particular facts, the propriety of the type of suit was rec-
ognized under the agency theory; Gary v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co.,
37 Ga. App. 744, 141 S. E. 819 (1928); Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas
Pacific Ry. Co. v. Hill, supra note 16.
23 Swart v. W. P. Huston, doing business as Kansas Theatre, 4 LABOR
CASES ff 60, 714 (1941); Hudson v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific
Railway, supra note 3.2
, That is the procedure which was followed in cases such as Gulla v.
Barton, supra note 16.25 Hamilton, supra note 11. The writer also suggests the difficulty in
handling the case of non-recognition of seniority rights. There is some
question as to whether such action is to be treated as a complete breach
of the entire contract.
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asking for specific performance of these agreements. The equity courts
were at first reluctant to issue injunctions in this type of case. The old
equitable doctrines of refusal to require performance of personal service
contracts, and the need for unique types of labor and for mutuality of
obligation or remedy were all difficulties which had to be overcome. Grad-
ually, however, the courts began to allow the desired relief. This remedy
has been resorted to most often in cases involving the reinstatement of
seniority rights26 and the rehiring of employees wrongfully discharged.
Closely related to the injunction is the use by individual employees
of the declaratory judgment. Such proceedings have been employed to
establish the seniority rights of an employee under an agreement27 and
to determine whether or not the employer is required to pay union
wages upon a particular job.2 8 This procedure can, of course, be used
generally to determine the validity of any particular provision in a
collective agreement, such as a closed shop clause. While the greater
number of jurisdictions now seem to recognize that collective labor
agreements do give to the individual employee certain rights which he
may enforce judicially, there still remains the question as to which
employees may avail themselves of these rights. Is it necessary that
they be members of the union before they are afforded the benefits
of the agreement, or is it sufficient if they are simply employees of the
employer with whom the collective contract has been made?
The Nature of the Employee's Rights:
It would seem to be fairly simple to extend the individual rights
existing under the collective contract to the non-union laborer, once
it is recognized that the union member has such rights. Clearly, if the
usage theory is applied, the question as to whether a worker is a union
member would have little relevancy, the important question being
whether he had knowledge of the existence of the usage and contracted
with reference to it.29
In jurisdictions recognizing the third party beneficiary rationale, the
problem is one of determining the particular class of employees intended
to be benefited by the agreement. Since the union's aim of maintaining
a set of standards throughout an industry is fostered by extending the
benefits thereof to all workers, it is logical to assume that the parties
to the agreement intended such a result, unless there is some express
language negativing such a conclusion."0
26 Dooley v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. of Penn., 130 N. J. Eq. 75, 21 A. (2d)
334 (1941); Note (1938) 51 HARv. L. REV. 520.
2 Burton v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nay. Co., 148 Ore. 648, 38 P. (2d)
72 (1934), recognized the availability of a declaratory judgment, but relief
was denied on the facts.28Key v. George E. Breece Lumber Co., 4 N. M. 397, 115 P. (2d) 622
(1941).
21 Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Webb, supra note 1.
30 Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Sideboard, supra note 4. This case and the
Webb case cited in note 29 are of especial interest since the employee con-
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It is much more difficult, if not impossible, to allow a non-union
employee to sue if the agency doctrine is applied. The basis for finding
agency is membership in the union rather than the status of employee.
There is nothing upon which the agency can be based if the plaintiff is
a non-union worker, which illustrates another weakness of this doctrine.
It is possible, of course, to evolve some theory of ratification or adop-
tion of the contract, but such an approach is hardly realistic.
The exact nature of the individual employee's rights must also be con-
sidered, and this involves, generally, the problem of modification of the
agreement. Can the union modify the contract in such a way as to
destroy the employee's rights? If the third party beneficiary approach
is used to uphold the agreement, applying strict contract rules, the
worker's rights under the contract have become vested, and can not
be modified without his consent. Thus the Washington court has
stated:
"After a contract for the benefit of a third person has been
accepted or acted on by such third person beneficiary, the con-
tract can not be rescinded by the parties without his consent." 31
Under the usage theory, however, it is possible to hold that the agree-
ment can be modified by the original parties. The new usage thus cre-
ated will in turn become a part of each worker's contract of employment
if the employee continues in his employment with knowledge of it. This
again presents the inconsistency, noted earlier, of attempting to modify
a usage which is predicated upon stability and long-term use.
82
The agency approach also fails to suggest any method by which the
agreement may be modified by the union without the consent of the
employee, the former's principal. There is a possibility in this situation,
however, of holding that the members of a union consent in advance to
any modification agreed to by the majority.38
The need for flexibility in these agreements should not be overlooked,
since the union must have the right to alter the provisions for the benefit
of the workers as a whole, as it would be highly undesirable to freeze
existing labor conditions for long periods. The courts, often without
too much theoretical justification, have apparently upheld the power
cerned was a colored non-union worker unable to become a member of
the union. They both arose out of identical factual situations, and the
difference in result may be explained on the basis of the difference in the
approaches used. A difficult problem is suggested in a Note (1941) 41
COL. L. REv. 304, namely, what should be done where the employee who
attempts to obtain the benefits of the agreement is a member of a rival
union? May he still claim that the contracting parties intended to benefit
him? The author of the Note also raises the question whether an employee
who has given up his membership in the contracting union can still claim
rights under the collective agreement.1 Huston v. Washington Wood & Coal Co., supra note 16.
32 See page 184, supra.
3 Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts, 48 'YALE L. J.
195 (1938).
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of the union to modify the collective agreement. The general basis of
the welfare of all workers has been suggested as a justification by
some courts.
"The brotherhood had power by agreement with the railway
to create the seniority rights of plaintiff, and it likewise by the
same method had the power to modify or destroy these rights
in the interest of all members."3 4
Other courts have merely found that the union possessed this power
because it was a party to the contract.
"The transaction is an agreement between an employer and
a labor union designed by the latter to benefit itself and those
members who enter the employer's service. The employees
stands no higher than the union. If it modifies the agreement
with the employer, the employee must acquiesce. In no correct
sense is the union an agent. It is principal."3 5
Such an approach is antipathetical to any doctrine of the existence
of vested rights in the individual employee.
This right of the union to alter the contract has occasionally been re-
pudiated. 6 Thus in the case of Ahlquist v. Alaska Portland Packers
Ass'n,37 oral modifications entered into by the union delegate were held
not to change the contracts of the workers unless it should be established
that the agent was authorized so to act by the employees involved in the
action. This was held not to be shown by evidence that in prior seasons
all dealings with the employees had been carried on through such dele-
gates.
The problem is today of less significance because most agreements
expressly reserve power to modify or alter the terms, or set out the
method by which they may be changed or terminated. Therefore, the
individual employee's rights are never absolute, but are subject to the
condition subsequent that they may be divested if the union and em-
ployer modify the terms of the collective agreement. Such a power may
likewise be assumed by the courts to be impliedly reserved where there
is no language on which to base an express reservation. Since the very
nature of the agreement is such that the union must have power to
adjust the terms, and since the general purpose of the agreement would
be fulfilled by such a reservation, it would be sound to contend that
each individual takes his rights under the contract subject to the possi-
bility of subsequent modification. This rule would be applicable no
matter which approach is adopted by the courts.
Often in a suit by an employee for damages or for specific perform-
ance of an agreement, the employer has advanced as a defense the argu-
ment that the employee has himself modified the agreement. This
34 Hartley v. Brotherhood, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N. W. 885 (1938). Also see
Burton v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nay. Co., supra note 27.
35 Donovan v. Travers, 285 Mass. 167, 188 N. E. 705, 707 (1934).
31 By dictum in the Huston case, supra note 16.
37 39 F. (2d) 348 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930).
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again involves policy considerations, as well as abstract legal principles.
If each individual employee is allowed the right to modify the agreement
for himself, the collective contract would be reduced to a nullity.
Furthermore, the individual employee, in altering the contract, would
again be in the disadvantageous bargaining position which the right to
bargain collectively is designed to correct. Economic coercion would
make it comparatively easy for the employer to form individual con-
tracts relegating the collective agreement to a position of legal ineffec-
tiveness.
Nonetheless, the courts have held that the employee may modify the
agreement. The worker "may forego his opportunity for benefits under
that contract and continue to work under another agreement with his
employer and accept the compensation stipulated in the agreement."38
In so holding, the Washington court seems to have felt that its conclu-
sion was a necessary corollary of the third party beneficiary doctrine,
holding that under the beneficiary rationale the employee need not
accept the benefits bestowed upon him. Theoretically this analysis may
be sound, since a donee may refuse to accept a gift, but it is very diffi-
cult to believe that a worker would voluntarily refuse to accept an
increased wage scale, the benefit bestowed in the Washington case.
A similar approach was used in Langmade v. Olean Brewing Co.,3 9
which illustrates the evils of allowing such modification. The union
agreement there involved contained a provision stipulating for time-
and-a-half for overtime. The plaintiff, after working overtime, asked
for the additional compensation and was denied it. He was informed.
that if he desired more money he should work in the bottling works.
Upon a subsequent request for overtime pay, he was informed that if
he was not satisfied with the compensation he could quit, and was finally
told that if he continued in the employment of the defendant, it would
be with the understanding that nothing was due him for overtime. In
such circumstances the employee dearly has little opportunity to vol-
untarily contract fo modify the agreement.
Modification by the individual employee can be justified under the
usage theory, and even more easily under the agency doctrine. And
in jurisdictions where the third party beneficiary doctrine is followed,
the Washington theory that the benefits of the agreement may be re-
pudiated offers a possible rationale to justify permitting individual
modification. However, in McNeil v. Hacker,40 the New York court
adopted the third party beneficiary approach and refused to allow an
employee to modify the collective agreement. The decision in that
case advanced two general arguments: First, that a contract cannot
be altered by one who is not a party to it; and second, that it is against
-8 Huston v. Washington Wood & Coal Co., supra note 16.
39 137 App. Div. 355, 121 N. Y. S. 388 (1910).40 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 432 (1940).
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public policy to allow an employee to enter into a contract which is
inconsistent with the terms of the collective bargain.4 1 The court relied
upon the so-called "kickback" statute41' as a declaration of a broad
general policy, and argued from that to the conclusion that an employee's
promise to accept less than the agreed wage fell within its purposes.
It is this last suggestion that such modifications are against public
policy which is the most sound and which seems to offer a satisfactory
solution to the problem. It has been suggested, similarly, that the
collective agreement be viewed in the same manner as a minimum wage
statute. This would prevent any modification, since the benefits pro-
vided for the employees by such an enactment may not be waived.42
Regardless of the theory adopted, it would appear that:
"The tendency of the cases is pretty clearly in the direction
of saying that an inconsistent agreement between employer
and employee is no bar to the latter's suing on the collective
bargain. Only one decision, however, adopts the rule as a
rule." 48
Many of these problems are now being adjusted by stipulating in
the collective agreement that the employer will not enter into any
separate contract altering the terms of the agreement.
Express contractual modification, however, has not been the only
argument advanced by the employer to bar recovery by an individual
employee. Accord and satisfaction and estoppel have also been relied
upon to defeat the enforcement of his rights under the contract. In
Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Webb, 44 the court, although applying the
usage theory and finding that the collective understanding had become
a part of the individual's contract, nonetheless denied recovery, in an
employee's suit for the difference between the wage paid him and that
provided for in the collective agreement, on the theory of accord and
satisfaction. The'court held that there bad been a real dispute as to
"The court noted that the agreement provided that the employer
would not enter into any contract with the individual employee to work
for a lesser wage. See also Gulla v. Barton, supra note 12, which again
denied the right to modify the collective agreement by individual con-
tract, and further held that the employee, not knowing of the terms of
the contract, could not waive them.
Il The policy of "kick-back" statutes is to make illegal an employee's
returning, or contracting to return, any portion of his wage to his employer.
42Note (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 695. The writer suggests a number of pos-
sible reasons for holding modifications by employees invalid in addition to
those already noted:
1. Modification is ineffective without the consent of all parties to the
contract.
2. There has been no actual meeting of the minds.
3. The employee's waiver is ineffective because he had no knowledge
of the benefits.
4. The union by-laws contain a contract between members and union
that the members will not contract inconsistently therewith.
43 Witmer, supra note 33 at page 235.
4" Supra note 1.
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what the employee should have been paid, and that when he accepted
the checks given him in full satisfaction of his claim, he compromised
and settled the dispute. The court suggested that the employee should
have refused the checks and sued for the proper amount. Again it
would appear as if contract law had been used to defeat the true pur-
pose of the agreement. The impracticability of the suggestion that
the employee refuse the check and sue for the proper amount is apparent.
The Huston case4 5 from this jurisdiction is very similar, although
the court employs language of estoppel. In that case the defendant
employer had entered into a collective agreement containing a provision
relative to wages and then hired the plaintiff under an individual con-
tract of employment providing for a lower rate of pay. The plaintiff
thereafter joined the union, but continued to accept the lower wage,
taking checks designated as being full payment of his claim for wages.
The court first decided that a third party beneficiary could contract
independently of the collective agreement, and then held that the plain-
tiff was now estopped to claim the additional pay for which he sued.
These accord and satisfaction and estoppel cases actually represent
an analysis of the modification problem in different terms. Like the
cases involving modification, these cases could be obviated by holding
that public policy prevents any waiver of the benefits conferred by the
agreement.
RIGHTS OF THE UNION
Closely related to the problem of the individual employee's right of
enforcement is the question of the collective right, the power of the
union to enforce the agreement. Fundamentally, of course, the first
requirement is that the courts recognize the agreement as creating a
contract between the union and the employer, or at least some legally
enforceable relation between these two parties. If the agreement is
viewed merely as establishing a usage, it is difficult to find any ground
upon which to base the union's right to maintain an action on the con-
tract. Similarly, under the agency doctrine the union as such has no
collective rights. It is only under the contractual approach, or some
similar theory, that the union can hope to succeed in asserting rights as
an entity distinct from its members. Nonetheless, the present status
of the law has been summarized as follows:
"Indeed in recent years decisions in any state which avoid
language indicating that legal rights and obligations normally
rise directly from collective employment agreements are
rare."46
The first problem to be determined is whether or not the union itself
can institute a suit. Clearly its officers, as representatives of the meme-
,5 Supra note 16. See also Note (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 695.
'6Rice, Jr. Collective Labor Agreements in American Law, 44 HARv.
L. Rev. 572, 597 (1931).
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bers, could prosecute a class action, but today in many jurisdictions,
including Washington,47 the right of a union to sue or be sued in its
own name has been recognized, even though it is an unincorporated
association. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also permit such a
suit.4
8
If there has been a breach of the collective right, it is recognized
that the union can sue to recover damages, 49 but again the problem
becomes one of determining the proper method of measuring the injury
suffered. There have been a number of interesting suggestions made
as to the proper measure of recovery, based upon the purpose of the
collective bargain. 0 The first suggestion is that the union is entitled to
maintenance damages. Since the purpose of a collective agreement is
to prevent the employer from lowering labor standards by forcing work-
ers to compete among themselves, and also to prevent competition
among employers at the expense of labor standards, the damages, under
this theory, should be equal to the amount the employer benefits by
failing to perform the contract. In addition to this, the union should
be entitled to any special damages which it can prove.
If the employer has breached the contract by cutting wages below
the union scale, and the individual worker involved does not bring suit,
the union should be entitled to sue for the difference between the com-
pensation received and that contracted for, together with such special
damages as it has incurred. This standard of recovery would very
effectively prevent wage-cutting.
Unions have seldom relied upon actions for damages to compensate
for losses suffered by reason of employers' breaches of collective labor
agreements. 51 Instead, they have turned to equity as affording the only
adequate relief in such cases. For many years there was considerable
doubt as to the availability to labor unions of injunctive relief against
such breaches of contract on the part of employers, while organized
labor itself long viewed the equity courts with suspicion, since injunctions
were frequently resorted to in order to break strikes and combat other
union activities. But finally, in Schlesinger v. Quinto,52 a union success-
17 St. Germain v. Bakery & C. Workers' Union, 97 Wash. 282, 166 Pac.
665 (1917); Labonite v. Cannery Workers' and Farm Laborers' Union, etc.,
197 Wash. 543, 86 P. (2d) 189 (1938).
"I Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 17; United Mine Workers v.
Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922).
9 Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N. Y. 207, 76 N. E. 5 (1905), where a union was
allowed recovery on a note given to secure the employer's performance
and to be applied as liquidated damages; Dubinsky v. Blue Dale Dress Co.,
162 Misc. 177, 292 N. Y. S. 898 (1936).
50 Witmer, supra note 33. This article includes an extensive discussion
of the question of damages.
5" The union is more concerned with specific performance of the agree-
ment, while the individual worker is concerned with recovering back pay.
" Schlesinger, et al, v. Quinto, et al, 201 App. Div. 487, 194 N. Y. S. 401
(1922).
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fully petitioned for an injunction. The contract involved in that case
had been made between an employers' association and a union. The
association passed a resolution requiring the individual employers to
break their contract, under threat of a penalty. The union, through its
president, sued to restrain the association from enforcing this resolution
and thus breaking the collective agreement. As a defense, the employers
offered all of the venerated equity principles which had proved sufficient
in the past, but the court refuted each argument, restrained the breach,
and ordered the resolution rescinded.
This case was a great victory for labor, and since that time unions
have successfully resorted to equitable relief.53 An illustration of the
length to which courts will go in enforcing these agreements is afforded
by the case of Dubinwky v. Blue Dale Dress Co."4 Here again 'the
contract had been entered into by an employers' association, but the
breach was threatened by a single manufacturer. The clause litigated
provided that "No member of the association shall, during the term
of this agreement, move his shop or factory from its present location to
any' place beyond which the public carrier fare is more than 5 cents."
The defendant manufacturer secretly moved his entire plant to Archbald,
Pennsylvania, and also effectively locked out his union employees,
which constituted a violation of another provision of the contract. The
court ordered the defendant to move back into New York and to rehire
all its forriier union employees. It is also of interest that a referee was
appointed to compute the damages suffered by the plaintiffs. This was
an unusual exercise of the equity power when one recalls the normal
reluctance of a court to order an act to be done outside of its jurisdic-
tion. But although this argument was presented, the court declared
that it had power to issue the decree because the parties were all before
the court and the company was a New York corporation.
The propriety of injunctive relief for labor unions has, of course,
been questioned. The older cases, and even recent ones in some juris-
dictions, follow the arguments of Schwartz v. Wayne, 5 holding that
an injunction will not lie to compel an employer to refrain from breach-
ing his contract with a union. It is also possible that even a liberal court,
which recognizes the propriety of granting injunctive relief in such
cases, may deny such relief on the ground that the union is not the
proper part i to bring the suit. Thus in an action for a mandatory
injunction to compel reinstatement of employees discharged in viola-
F3 Wassersteim v. Beim, 163 Misc. 160, 294 N. Y. S. 439 (1937); Goldman
v. Cohen, 222 App. Div. 631, 227 N. Y. S. 311 (1928).
5' 162 Misc. 177, 292 N. Y. S. 898 (1936).
Gr Schwartz v. Driscoll, Acting Circuit Judge, 217 Mich. 384, 186 N. W.
522 (1922).
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tion of an agreement, the New Jersey court held 6 that the union could
not ask for this relief, since the controversy was one solely between the
discharged employees and the employers. This decision is, however,
subject to some criticism.
The importance to a union of being able to sue for an injunction can-
not be denied.
"If the union has not the right to invoke the aid of a court
of equity to prevent the unlawful violation of a contract * * *,
then such a contract loses much of its force, and the rights of
collective bargaining are narrowed, and the economic benefits
to the community from collective bargaining to a great extent
lost.""'
This very fact constitutes a strong argument in favor of granting
such relief in actions to prevent violation of labor contracts.
The final form of relief, that of the declaratory judgment, is also
available to a labor union, and thus it may obtain a determination as to
the validity and interpretation of a particular agreement.18  It thus
appears, then, that our judicial system today provides a number of
methods by which unions and their members may enforce their rights
under collective labor agreements. This victory for labor was won,
however, only after the innumerable defenses advanced by defendant
employers had been met and refuted.
DEFENSES
The defenses which have been advanced by employers fall into
definite patterns. Naturally there are often special facts and circum-
stances which may be validly urged by an employer as a defense to a
particular action, but our concern here is with the more typical defenses,
which have been relied upon to defeat enforcement of collective labor
contracts.
The union's lack of capacity to contract was one of the earliest
objections raised to defeat the validity of the labor agreement as a con-
tract between the union and the employer. Since the union was not
incorporated, it was not an entity and therefore could not, in the eyes of
the law, make a contract. An agreement between an employers' asso-
ciation and a union was therefore described as follows:
"Nominally it was between the two international associa-
tions. But really it could not have been so, because each of
said associations lacked juristic personalty. So far as there
was any real contract at all, it must have been between the
individual members of the different local associations." 59
Christiansen et al. v. Local 680, 126 N. J. Eq. 508, 10 A. (2d) 168 (1940).
See also Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Associated Milk Dealers, 42 F. Supp.
584 (N. D. Ill., 1941).
r' Goldman v. Cohen, supra note 53.
" In the Christiansen case, supra note 56, the court recognized that
the union was entitled to a declaratory judgment as to the validity of an
agreement.
-1 A. R. Barnes & Co. v. Berry, 169 Fed. 225 (C. C. A. 6th, 1909).
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Modernly, of course, this defense has to a large extent been repudiated.
With the recognition of unions by national and state labor laws as
proper bargaining agencies, their ability to contract has also been con-
ceded.60 Likewise, the recognition by both federal and state courts of
the right of such groups to sue and be sued in the same manner as if
incorporated has done much to establish their contractual capacity.
The defense of lack of consideration was perhaps more important
as an impediment in the way of unions and individual employees seek-
ing to enforce their rights under collective labor contracts. If the view
is adopted, as under the usage theory, that the only contracts which
exist are those between the individual employees and their employer,
this problem at once arises because the normal contract of employment
provides for no definite period of hiring. Therefore it is terminable at
will. Or if the understanding is viewed from the collective angle, there
is still no promise on the part of the union to supply employees, and
it can therefore be argued that there is lack of consideration. 61
This apparent difficulty has by now been generally removed by the
willingness of most courts to find consideration in a variety of circum-
stances. Also, in the usual collective agreement there are certain
covenants given by the union which can easily be held to afford con-
sideration. The promise not to strike or to participate in any type of
labor disturbances for a set period of time, not to ask for wage in-
creases, 62 and similar undertakings can be pointed to.6 3 The privilege
of using the union label and holding out one's product as made by a
union* firm has also been held to be sufficient consideration.6 4 Gord v.
F. S. Harmon & Co., a Washington case, is an interesting example
of the courts' attempts to read consideration into agreements of this
sort. The workers in that case had been out on strike, and the con-
troversy seemed impossible of settlement. It was at last agreed, how-
ever, that they would refer the problem to the Pacific Northwest
Regional Labor Board, that its decision would be final, and that its
determination as to wages was to be retroactive to the day of begin-
ning work. It was this final stipulation that the employer later attempt-
ed to evade, and the defense of lack of consideration was advanced. The
court, rejecting the employer's contention, found consideration in the
employees' returning to work upon the execution of the agreement.
This, being beneficial to the employer, was held sufficient to make the
agreement binding.
6oMcNally v. Reynolds et al., 7 F. Supp. 112 (W. D., Wash., 1934).
61 Christenson, Legally Enforceable Interests in American Labor Union
Working Agreements, 9 Iwm. L. J. 69, 73.
62 Gilchrist Co. v. Metal Polishers, etc., Union, 113 Atl. 320 (N. J. 1919).
1 TE.LE, LABOR DismUTEs AD COLLEcTIVE BARGAnuxG (1940) Ch. 10,
§ 160.
11 Gulla v. Barton, supra note 16.
65 188 Wash. 134, 61 P. (2d) 1294 (1936).
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The Cross Mountain Coal Co. case66 also exemplifies the liberality
of some courts in finding sufficient consideration for an individual
employment contract, under the usage theory, from the fact that the
employee has worked under the agreement and is still willing to continue
performance of it. Finally, a liberal court may simply find an implied
duty on the part of the union which will afford sufficient consideration
for the employer's undertaking.
"While it is true that there is no express agreement on the
part of the union to furnish labor at the prices and under the
terms and conditions prescribed in the contract, its very pur-
pose and object was to prescribe terms under which the mem-
bers of the union would work and the contractors would
employ. It was therefore, we think, a necessarily implied term
of the agreement that the union, its officers and members,
would collectively abide by the terms of the agreement, and
would not collectively or as an organization exercise any right
or do any act it or they might otherwise lawfully exercise or
do, which was in conflict with any of the terms of the agree-
ment; and that the union would enforce the contract to the
extent of its powers over its members under its constitution and
by-laws. Clearly, we think, what the contractors were bargain-
ing for, and what they obtained under the agreement was free-
dom from industrial dispute, strike or collective adverse action
on the part of the union, its officers, and its members during
the term covered by the agreement."
6 7
An even more difficult problem for the unions, however, was to
establish their right to injunctive relief in the face of the argument of
lack of mutuality of remedy or of obligation. It was argued that an
employer could not obtain an injunction against an employee to compel
him to continue his employment or to restrain him from breaching
his contract of employment. Therefore, since this form of equitable
relief was denied to the employer, it should also be denied to the
employee.
Until the decision in Schlesinger case67 this argument was thought
to be insurmountable, apparently not only by the employers but by
the union as well, but that opinion effectively disposed of the conten-
tion. The position of the court may be illustrated by the following
quotation from its opinion:
"Two organizations, one composed of employers and the
other of employees, have entered into an agreement. Each had
power through the consent of its members to enter into a bind-
ing obligation in their behalf. * * * This contract has mutual
obligation binding on the parties thereto. Each party knows
66 Supra note 10.
67 Harper v. Local Union No. 520, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, 48 S. W. (2d) 1033, 1040 (Tex. Civ. App., 1932).
17 Supra note 52.
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the obligation that it has assumed and the consequence of
failure or refusal to perform those requirements. Through its
control of its members it can compel performance. Under such
circumstances a decree of a court of equity can be enforced
against either party in favor of the other. * * * An organiza-
tion, having such power to require performance by individual
members, can through its officers be compelled to exercise that
power. There is in this contract mutuality of obligation, and
there is also a mutuality of remedy for its enforcement."
Since the doctrine of mutuality of obligation and remedy has been
seriously modified, if not completely discarded, thi argument presents
little difficulty in the enforcement of collective labor agreements. 7 b
Furthermore, employers are now also often allowed injunctions, thus
creating actual mutuality of remedy.
Another equitable defense, closely related to lack of mutuality, arose
out of the general reluctance of the courts specifically to enforce con-
tracts for personal services.6 The relationship between employer and
employee is such that the courts long felt it undesirable to compel an
unwilling employer or employee to continue performance of the em-
ployment contract. But modernly, the courts have circumvented the
difficulties in issuing an injunction for specific performance of a con-
tract for employment by ignoring the personal aspects thereof and
treating it solely in its collective aspect.69 Therefore it is possible for
an employer to obtain an injunction against a union to prevent it from
breaching its contract, and as a necessary corollary, the union has
the same right against the employer. This approach of the courts has
been termed the clump of labor" doctrine, since it views the contract
not as the employment of specific persons but as an undertaking by
the union relating to the hiring of "unspecified persons from a speci-
fied group.170
It should also be noted that it has been claimed that there is an ade-
quate remedy at law, that no injunction should issue because the serv-
ices involved were not unique,71 and, finally, that to enforce the con-
tract would require too constant surveillance by the court. The irre-
7b For an interesting discussion of the problem of mutuality see
Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry. Co. v. Hill, supra note 16.8 Schwartz v. Driscoll, supra note 55.
60 This argument was raised in the Harper case, supra note 67, and the
court held that in its collective aspects it was not a contract of personal
employment, since the employer and the union do not contract for the
employment of particular workers. Also in Greater City Master Plumbers'
Assn., Inc., v. Kahme, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 589 (1937), the court, in discussing
the right to compel the union to perform the contract, held that it was
not forcing individual employees to work. As individuals they were free
to act as they desired. It was only the union that was being restrained.
"
0Witmer, supra note 33, at page 204.
1 Stone Cleaning & Painting Union v. Russell, 38 Misc. 513, 77 N. Y. S.
1049 (1904). This case, of course, is no longer the rule in New York, as
subsequent cases have held that the injunction will be issued.
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parable nature of the injury and the inadequacy of damages have, of
course, now been conceded by the courts. 2 The other two contentions
are likewise of less importance today because of the courts' general
attitude toward these agreements.73
Occasionally, the employers have advanced the contention that the
collective agreement is void because formed under duress. The out-
standing example of this is found in the Wassersteim case.74 The plain-
tiff employees had called a strike during the rush season, at which time
it was imperative for the employer to be able to continue his produc-
tion. He therefore executed a collective agreement with his workers,
but upon the termination of the busy period he refused to perform and
attempted to defend an action for an injunction on the ground of duress.
The court, finding that the strike had been validly called and conducted,
refused to invalidate the agreement as one entered into under duress.
Another defense which has been asserted by employers and unions
alike is that they have become dissatisfied with the terms of the agree-
ment, or that conditions have changed, rendering it impractical to
enforce the contract. The courts have refused to recognize this as a
valid defense on behalf of either party to the agreement. 75
It has often been contended that such agreements are invalid because
in violation of the anti-trust law for one reason or another. The closed
shop clause is most often subjected to this attack, but since the general
validity of such a provision will be discussed later, its relation to the
anti-trust law will not now be considered. This defense has also been
asserted against other provisions peculiar to the particular cases to
which they give rise, but since they are not normally found in collective
contracts, they need not be considered here.
7 6
Another defense which has been advanced is that a plaintiff employee
has failed first to exhaust his relief under the agreement, as through
7.Goldman v. Cohen, supra note 53.
7
-
3 Witmer suggests one other problem which should be noted, and that
is the difficulties that will arise where the contract provides specifically
that the employer is to take a definite number of employees. Forcing an
unwilling employer to hire these men is, of course, contrary to normal
equity practice. Nevertheless, that is the procedure followed by the
N. L. R. B. in reinstatement cases, and Witmer suggests that the approach
of the Board may prove helpful to the courts in their search for a solution
of the problem.
-4 Wassersteim v. Beim et al., supra note 53.
1 Greater City Master Plumbers' Assn., Inc. v. Kahme, supra note 69,
and Harper v. Local Union No. 520, supra note 67. A practical solution for
this problem has been found in making these collective labor agreements
for shorter periods of time and providing methods for their modification
if changes in conditions should make such a course necessary or advisable.
76 For an example, see National Assn. of Window Glass Mfg. et al
v. U. S., 263 U. S. 403 (1923). The general question of the anti-trust laws
and the labor movement constitutes another entirely distinct field, with a
considerable literature of its own.
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appeals to various types of grievance committees. This would seem to
be a valid defense and should be sustained if the employee can obtain
adequate relief by resorting to the established agencies. Finally, the
fact that an arbitration award has been rendered which determined
the matter adversely to the employee or party plaintiff has also been
relied upon to bar recovery.
77
RIGHETS OF THE EmPLOYER
Although many of the defenses which an employer may offer, such
as the last two noted above, are valid and may effectively defeat an
action by a union or an individual employee, yet our general conclusion
must be that a collective bargaining agreement does create rights for
labor, both collectively and individually, which have been recognized
and enforced by the courts. But accompanying those rights are obliga-
tions imposed upon the unions and individual employees, which in turn
create rights in the employers with whom they contract. And these,
too, have now received judicial sanction.
The problems confronting an employer when he attempts to bring
a suit upon a collective agreement are quite similar to those which we
have just considered in discussing the rights of unions and individual
employees. There is the right of the employer as an individual and,
less often, the collective right of an employers' association, which is
becoming a matter of ever increasing importance. If the agreement has
been entered into by an employers' association, the courts have gener-
ally found that the individual employer is bound by the agreement on
the theory of agency,78 and by the same token, he is enabled to assert
rights created by the contract.
Damages have proved to be an even less satisfactory remedy for
employers than for employees and their unions. There are very few
cases in which an employer has obtained damages from an individual
employee, and the difficulties he would have in collecting a damage
judgment, together with the difficulty in finding some theory upon
which to hold the employee obligated, are probably largely responsible
for this situation. But equally important is the difficulty of proving
that the particular employee has been guilty of any breach of the con-
77Hamilton, supra note 11.
78 Blum & Co. v. Landau, 23 Ohio App. 426, 155 N. E. 154 (1926), where
the court also found a subsequent ratification of the agreement. In Dubin-
sky v. Blue Dale Dress Co., supra note 49, damages were allowed against
an individual employer for breach of a contract formed by an employers'
association of which he was a member. In A. R. Baimes & Co. v. Berry,
supra note 59, the court found that the individual employer had ratified
the action of the association.
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tract himself, unless he has actively participated in the wrongs com-
plained of, or voted to breach the contract.?9
There is particular difficulty in establishing a basis upon which to
hold an individual employee liable if the third party beneficiary rationale
is adopted. As has already been mentioned, it is very difficult to find
that such a beneficiary has also become an obligor under a contract
entered into for his benefit by the union and the employer. Of course,
the agency theory offers a solution to this problem, because as principal
the employee clearly would be liable. Likewise, the usage doctrine pro-
vides a method of holding the individual worker responsible for the
breach of his own contract of employment.
Even though some legal theory might be evolved by which the em-
ployer could recover damages against the employee individually, there
is still the practical consideration that such relief is apt to be very
inadequate. If damages are sought, an action against the collective
group would seem to be more likely to achieve the desired end. It is
here that employers have themselves run into the objection, which they
long asserted against actions by unions to enforce these contracts, that
a union is a voluntary unincorporated association. In the more liberal
jurisdictions, of course, this is now solved from the procedural stand-
point, and an employer can sue a union as such. Nevertheless, there is
still a great deal of controversy over the financial irresponsibility of
labor unions, and much effort has been put forth in an attempt to re-
quire that they be incorporated.
Even when damages are allowed to an employer as against a union,
there is ever present the problem of the proper measure of recovery. In
an action by the Netherland-American Steamship Company against a
longshoremen's union,80 the plaintiff employer sued to recover damages
caused by a strike and the refusal of the union workers to unload one
of its ships. The recovery was limited to what it would have cost to
unload the ship at the additional wage demanded, denying the demur-
rage charges for which the employer asked. The case has been approved
as applying the proper measure of recovery, i. e., the unavoidable loss
actually caused by the strike. From the standpoint of the employer
the purpose of the agreement was to get men to work for it at the stipu-
Ited wage. Breach of the contract would therefore result in a definite
loss, either a measurable loss of business, or else increased cost through
having to pay the wage demanded. Logically, therefore, the employer's
79 Whiting Milk Co. v. Grondin, supra note 17, .where an employer sued
an individual employee; Note (1938) 51 HARV. L. Rav. 520, 528.
80 Nederlandsch Amerikaansche Stoomvaart Maatschappij v. Stevedores'
& Longshoremen's Benevolent Soc. et al., 265 Fed. 397 (E. D. La., 1920).
It is of interest to note that here the union advanced the defense of lack
of mutuality.
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recovery should be limited to this loss actually suffered.81
Because of the peculiar nature of a collective labor agreement, equit-
able relief seems more satisfactory for employers as well as for the
unions and individual employees, and an employer is allowed to enjoin
the breach of an agreement by the union with which he has contracted.
The employer, however, has another difficulty to meet when he sues for
an injunction. Usually the action of the union which he is attempting
to enjoin is a strike in breach of the terms of the contract or to compel
a change in those terms. There is available to the union in such cases
the defense that it is against public policy to enjoin the strike. Although
some courts have upheld this contention, others have granted the in-
junction on the theory of thereby giving mutuality of remedy with
respect to the agreement.
82
When an action is brought against a union to restrain it from calling
a strike or to compel it to perform its contract, there would seem to be
no difficulty in granting the relief sought. However, when the striking
employees include non-union laborers as well as union members, can
it be said that the non-union workers are striking in violation of any
agreement? Also there is the further question whether a union is liable
for the action of its members in striking without its approval. 8  It is in
these situations that the common law approaches attempted to be ap-
plied by the courts fall far short of providing an adequate solution. As
to the latter situation, the answer may perhaps be found in the fact
that a union is presumed to have disciplinary powers over its members,
and consequently it is fair to hold the union liable for their conduct.
And although the striking of non-union employees without the aid and
assistance of a union is infrequent, still these are problems which are
presented and which seem to require that the courts adopt some new
legal approach for their solution. The development of powerful minor-
ity unions antagonistic to the aims and interests of the majority bar-
gaining units in our various industrial establishments will probably
force these problems into even sharper relief.
With the judicial recognition of the right of the employer to obtain
a declaratory judgment as to the validity of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, his rights for .the enforcement of the collective agreement are
rounded out and become as complete as those of the union. 4 In the
81Witmer, supra note 33.82Greater City Master Plumbers' Assn., Inc. v. Kahme, supra note 69,
where the court allowed the injunction. Cf. Nevins, Inc. v. Kasmach, 279
N. Y. )323, 1 N. E. (2d) 294 (1938); but see Nevins; Inc. v. Khsmach, 300
N. Y. S. 64 (1937), a memorandum opinion holding that enforcement of
a covenant not to strike is against public policy.
13 Note (1938) 51 HARV. L. REv. 520.
84F. F. East Co., Inc. v. United Oystermen's Union 19600 et al., 130
N. J. Eq. 292, 21 A. (2d) 799 (1941), reversing 128 N. J. Eq. 27, 15 A. (2d)
129 (1940).
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actions brought by the employer, the union, of course, asserts many
of the defenses already noted. The reasons for denying the validity of
such arguments when advanced against the union apply equally when
the union is contending for their applicability.
(To be continued.)
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The law school embarked on another school year without the services
of four of its faculty members, who have been called by the Govern-
ment for various governmental positions. On leaves of absence from
the faculty are Professors Alfred E. Harsch, John W. Richards, Warren
L. Shattuck, and John B. Sholley.
Professor Harsch was the first member to leave the faculty and has
been appointed rent director of the Puget Sound Defense Rental Area
with offices in Seattle.
Professor Richards has been commissioned a lieutenant senior grade
in the United States Naval Reserve and is engaged in active duty as
an instructor at the Navy Pre-Flight School at Iowa City, Iowa.
Professor Shattuck has been called by the United States Army and
is now a first lieutenant in the infantry. He is stationed at Fort Douglas,
Utah.
Professor Sholley is serving as state price attorney with the Office of
Price Administration and has his office in Seattle.
The classes formerly conducted by the absentees have been divided
among the remaining members of the faculty of the law school.
